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HOW NOT TO COUNT VOTES
John Copeland Nagle*
Rutherford B. Hayes defeated Samuel Tilden by one electoral vote in the
presidential election of 1876. In Fraud of the Century: Rutherford B.
Hayes, Samuel Tilden, and the Stolen Election of 1876, Roy Morris,
Jr. concludes that the election was stolen from Tilden by Republican par-
tisans serving on the canvassing boards in the three Southern states-Flor-
ida, Louisiana, and South Carolina-that were still under the control of
Republican governments backed by the federal army. But in Centennial
Crisis: The Disputed Election of 1876, Chief Justice William H. Rehn-
quist defends the integrity and the actions of the Supreme Court Justices who
served on the special Electoral Commission that Congress established to re-
solve the disputed claims about the election. The 1876 election, and the
analogous difficulties attending the 2000 election, demonstrate the need to
consider who counts votes in contested elections, and how to best balance the
sometimes competing needs of independence, expertise, and timeliness.
CENTENNIAL CRISIS: THE DISPUTED ELECTION OF 1876. By Wil-
liam H. Rehnquist. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004. Pp. 274.
FRAUD OF THE CENTURY: RUTHERFORD B. HAYES, SAMUEL
TILDEN, AND THE STOLEN ELECTION OF 1876. By Roy Morris, Jr.
New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003. Pp. 311.
INTRODUCTION
Two weeks before the 1876 presidential election, Republican candi-
date Rutherford B. Hayes confided in his diary that "danger is imminent:
A contested result. And we have no such means for its decision as ought
to be provided by law."' Hayes could not have imagined how prophetic
his words would soon become, for he defeated Samuel Tilden by one
electoral vote-185 to 184-only after it was determined that all four con-
tested states-Florida, Louisiana, Oregon, and South Carolina-had cast
their votes for Hayes. Tilden's supporters insisted that Democratic votes
* Professor, Notre Dame Law School (nagle.8@nd.edu). I am grateful for the
excellent assistance provided by the staff of the Notre Dame Law School library, the
comments of Joe Bauer, A.J. Bellia, Rick Garnett, Abner Greene, Mike Paulsen, and Bob
Rodes on an earlier draft, the suggestions offered by my colleagues at Notre Dame during
a faculty colloquium, and the research assistance of Kacy Romig.
1. Letter from Rutherford B. Hayes to William Henry Smith (Oct. 22, 1876) in 3 Diary
and Letters of Rutherford Birchard Hayes: Nineteenth President of the United States 370,
370 (Charles Richard Williams ed., 1924) [hereinafter Hayes Diary and Letters]. Hayes
added that "[w]e should not allow another Presidential election to occur before a means
for settling a contest is provided." Id. See also Harry Barnard, Rutherford B. Hayes and
His America 314 (1954) (quoting Cincinnati journalist Murat Halstead's pre-election day
remark that "[a] disputed presidential election would Mexicanize us. There is incalculable
ruin in it").
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had been wrongfully ignored in the three Southern states, while the Re-
publican supporters of Hayes complained that African Americans had
been intimidated from voting for Hayes in those states. The dispute was
not resolved by any of the extant constitutional provisions or federal stat-
utes, but rather by the 8-7 vote of a special commission that Congress
established solely for the purpose of resolving the election. Congress ac-
cepted that result just before Hayes was inaugurated on March 4, 1877.
Of course, all of this was echoed in the 2000 presidential election,
which elicited its own cries of a stolen election and accusations hurled at
the parties involved in deciding it, especially the Supreme Court of the
United States. The parallels between the 1876 and 2000 elections were
recognized in Bush v. Gore2 itself. Justice Breyer wrote in dissent that
the participation in the work of the Electoral Commission by
five Justices, including Justice Bradley, did not lend that process
legitimacy. Nor did it assure the public that the process had
worked fairly, guided by the law. Rather, it simply embroiled
Members of the Court in partisan conflict, thereby undermining
respect for the judicial process.
3
Many more lessons of the presidential election of 1876 are re-
counted in two books that have appeared since the events of 2000: Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist's Centennial Crisis: The Disputed Election of
1876,4 and Roy Morris, Jr.'s The Fraud of the Century: Rutherford B. Hayes,
Samuel Tilden, and the Stolen Election of 1876.5 Rehnquist and Morris note
the many historical parallels between 1876 and 2000, while identifying
some critical differences as well.6 Chief Justice Rehnquist declined to re-
spond to Justice Breyer's reference to the 1876 election in Bush v. Gore,
but Rehnquist does so in his book, defending the work of the Electoral
Commission and of the Supreme Court Justices who sat on it. Likewise,
while Rehnquist does not specifically address the plea for a law to resolve
contested presidential elections that Hayes recorded in his diary shortly
before the election of 1876, Rehnquist suggests that any quest for a
means of resolving such elections will be in vain. "Perhaps when such a
dispute erupts, there is no means of resolving it that will satisfy both
sides."'7 Rather than surrendering to that belief, I want to analyze the
different institutions that have attempted to resolve disputed elections,
sketch the criteria for evaluating their work, and outline the lessons that
emerge from the story of the presidential election of 1876 as told by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Roy Morris, Jr.
2. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
3. Id. at 157 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
4. William H. Rehnquist, Centennial Crisis: The Disputed Election of 1876 (2004).
5. Roy Morris, Jr., The Fraud of the Century: Rutherford B. Hayes, Samuel Tilden,
and the Stolen Election of 1876 (2003).
6. Rehnquist and Morris each begin their books with a list of the historical parallels
between 1876 and 2000. See Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 3-6; Morris, supra note 5, at 1-2.
7. Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 6.
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I. THE ELECTION OF 1876
Rehnquist and Morris tell this story from their differing perspectives
as the ChiefJustice of the Supreme Court of the United States-and thus
an active participant in the disputed 2000 election 8-and as a popular
Civil War historian and political correspondent. Both books provide a
rich description of the events that led Hayes, the Republican governor of
Ohio, to face Tilden, the Democratic governor of New York, in the gen-
eral election of 1876, the centennial year of the creation of the United
States.9 Hayes prevailed on the seventh ballot in the Republican Party
convention against the early favorite, Maine Representative James G.
Blaine-who inspired the eponymous state constitutional "Blaine Amend-
ments" that trouble us to this day'°-because of Blaine's inability to clear
his name from a scandal involving his sale of railroad bonds. Tilden had
a much easier road to the Democratic nomination as a result of his repu-
tation as a reforming governor who had successfully battled the corrup-
tion of Boss Tweed and Tammany Hall in New York City. The general
election became a referendum upon two distinct concerns: the wide-
spread corruption of the Grant Administration and the struggle to reest-
ablish state governments throughout the defeated states of the Confeder-
acy. Tilden appealed to those throughout the country who were fed up
with the corrupt mess in Washington and to white Southerners who
sought to recapture the control of their state governments from Republi-
can carpetbaggers and from newly free African Americans. Hayes was the
champion of those who feared the election could undo everything the
Civil War-just eleven years past-had achieved for African Americans at
the cost of much bloodshed, still vividly remembered by the many Union
soldiers now voting in the North. The Republican strategy, as Rehnquist
describes it, was "to impress on the electorate that while every Democrat
had not been a rebel, every rebel had been a Democrat."' "I Left unstated
was what Morris describes as "a more pressing problem, one that affected
everyone. That problem was race."1 2 Racial violence and threats of racial
violence had persisted in the decade after the Civil War, and they in-
creased as both parties sought to win the Southern states whose votes
could be critical in a close election.
8. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 111 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
9. For an overview of the period and the issues of concern in 1876, see Morris, supra
note 5, at 19-45; Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 7-32, 80-93. Biographical sketches of each
candidate appear in Morris, supra note 5, at 57-68 (discussing Hayes); id. at 84-108
(discussing Tilden); Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 33-51 (discussing Hayes); id. at 58-79
(discussing Tilden).
10. See Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1314 n.7 (2004) (noting the argument that
"Washington's Constitution was born of religious bigotry because it contains a so-called
'Blaine Amendment,' which has been linked with anti-Catholicism").
11. Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 85.
12. Morris, supra note 5, at 28. Throughout his book, Morris details the role that
race, and racial violence, played in the election. See id. at 28-30, 33-34, 41-44, 128-30,
146-55, 178-81, 190-92, 244-49.
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Rehnquist observes that as election day approached, "[f] or the first
time in twenty years, the Democratic Party in 1876 had at least an even
chance of electing its candidate for President. 1 3 Even so, the Chicago
Tribune proclaimed that "Republican confidence was never more unwa-
vering than now," though it added an ominous cautionary note: "pro-
vided the Confederate Tildenites permit a fair and honest election." 14
Finally, on election day Tilden emerged as the undisputed victor in seven-
teen states containing a total of 184 electoral votes, and Hayes clearly
prevailed in seventeen states with a total of 163 electoral votes. Tilden
won all of the former Confederate states that had emerged from recon-
struction (Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ten-
nessee, Texas, and Virginia), the border states (Delaware, Kentucky, and
Maryland), three Northeastern states (Connecticut, New Jersey, and New
York), and the three scattered states of Indiana, Missouri, and West Vir-
ginia. Hayes won a belt of states ranging from the West (California, Colo-
rado, and Nevada), through the Plains (Kansas and Nebraska), the Mid-
west (Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin), and
Pennsylvania, plus five states in New England (Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont). 15 The winner was unclear in
the three Southern states that were still under the control of Republican
governments backed by the federal army: Florida, Louisiana, and South
Carolina. Additionally, while Hayes won the popular vote by about 1,000
votes in Oregon, one of his electors there was also serving as a deputy
postmaster, thus violating the constitutional prohibition upon electors
holding federal office.' 6 Hayes would prevail only if he won all twenty of
the uncertain electoral votes: Louisiana's eight electoral votes, South
Carolina's seven, Florida's four, and the disputed elector in Oregon.
Conversely, Tilden would be elected if he captured just one of those
twenty electoral votes.
13. Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 32.
14. Id. at 91-92. For a succinct explanation of the constitutional system for electing
the president, see Abner Greene, Understanding the 2000 Election: A Guide to the Legal
Battles that Decided the Presidency 15-18 (2001).
15. See id. at 95-96 (listing states won by each candidate); Presidential Elections
1876-1888, in National Atlas of the United States, available at http://nationalatlas.gov/
elections/elect06.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2004) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(map showing electoral votes by state and candidate).
16. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (providing that no "Person holding an Office of
Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector"). As Rehnquist
explains, the deputy postmaster resigned his position after election day in an effort to cure
the constitutional problem. Oregon's Democratic governor sought to name the runner-up
candidate-a supporter of Tilden's-to the elector's position, but "[tihe clear intent of
[the state election statute] was that the remaining electors should fill the vacancy," and
those two Republican electors chose another elector who voted for Hayes. Rehnquist,
supra note 4, at 109-12. Similar problems arose with electors in several other states. See
id. at 174-75 (discussing a Hayes elector from Florida who had resigned as a United States
shipping commissioner before the election); id. at 178-79 (noting an unsuccessful
Democratic assertion that a Wisconsin elector was a federal employee). The issue was even
litigated in state court in Rhode Island. See infra text accompanying note 49.
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The presidency hung in the balance as various parties struggled to
identify-or create-the winner as soon as the results became known on
election night. Morris begins his book with the tale of how nearly every
newspaper throughout the nation proclaimed Tilden the winner on the
day after election day, save one: the New York Times. Morris describes
how John C. Reid, the managing editor of the New York Times, was instru-
mental in convincing Republican leaders on election night that Tilden
may not have won the election despite the initial returns suggesting as
much. Reid, explains Morris, was "a dyed-in-the-wool Republican parti-
san whose wartime exposure to southern Democrats, in the person of the
Confederate cavalrymen who had captured him outside Atlanta, Georgia,
in the summer of 1864 and carried him off to Andersonville Prison, had
left him with a permanent hatred for all things Democratic. ' ' 17 Seizing
upon an intercepted telegram from Democratic leaders indicating doubt
about the winner in several states, a few busy Republicans in New York
City-including former Union Army General Daniel E. Sicklesl 8-quickly
wired Republican officials in Florida, Louisiana, Oregon, and South Caro-
lina that "[w]ith your state sure for Hayes, he is elected. Hold your
state."19 Morris offers an especially detailed account of what happened in
those four states after election day as state canvassing boards and state
courts encountered-and sometimes were populated by-partisans of
doubtful integrity. The canvassing boards declared Hayes the winner in
each state, but Morris concludes that Tilden was almost certainly the
rightful winner in Louisiana, probably the victor in Florida by an even
closer vote than occurred in 2000, and perhaps the winner in South Caro-
lina, too.
Rehnquist emphasizes what happened once the United States Senate
received conflicting certifications of the electors from those states. Not
surprisingly, he devotes special attention to the role of the five Supreme
Court Justices who joined five senators and five representatives on a spe-
cial electoral commission that Congress established in January 1877 to
arbitrate the electoral disputes. Also not surprisingly, Rehnquist is less
willing than Morris to say who really won the election. Rehnquist instead
makes the legal case for the Electoral Commission's refusal to conduct a
de novo review of what happened in each of the three Southern states,
17. Morris, supra note 5, at 14.
18. Morris describes how Sickles had been "the personal prot6gl of President James
Buchanan" until Sickles shot the son of Francis Scott Key, who was having an affair with
Sickles's wife. Id. at 10. "Sickles was acquitted of his crime by reason of temporary insanity,
the first time such a legal defense had been used successfully in an American court of law."
Id. Sickles then lost a leg but received a Medal of Honor for his military service at
Gettysburg, became a Radical Republican who was the military commander of South
Carolina after the Civil War until removed by President Johnson, and was appointed by
President Grant as "the American minister to Spain, where his notorious dalliance with
that country's deposed queen, Isabella II, subsequently earned him the not entirely
undeserved or unwelcomed nickname 'the Yankee King of Spain."' Id. at 10-11.
19. Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 97.
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and he champions the integrity ofJustice Joseph Bradley, who was vilified
for casting what was regarded as the tie-breaking eighth vote for Hayes on
the commission. The truth will never really be known, but I, at least, am
persuaded that Louisiana's electoral votes should have been awarded to
Tilden instead of Hayes (as Morris insists), or that Louisiana's votes
should have been rejected altogether (as had occurred in the previous
presidential election in 1872), because of the apparent fraud committed
by the state's canvassing board. Without Louisiana's electoral votes,
neither candidate would have received a majority of the total electoral
votes, and therefore the Democratic-controlled House of Representatives
would have exercised its constitutional duty to select a new President. Ei-
ther way, Samuel Tilden would have been the nineteenth President of the
United States.
II. WHO COUNTS VOTES?
The outcome of the 1876 presidential election depended upon who
received the most votes. But counting the votes-both the popular votes
in each state and the electoral votes of all of the states-was itself a con-
tested exercise. Like 2000, when much of the attention concerned fac-
tual and legal disputes about which ballots counted as popular "votes" in
Florida, the disputes in 1876 involved questions about which popular and
electoral votes were properly included and excluded during the official
tabulation. The exercise of judgment in answering those factual and le-
gal questions makes the determination of who counts the votes crucial.
Indeed, many of the writers describing the presidential election of 1876
emphasized the "who counts the votes" question.20 That question raises
precisely the sort of structural constitutional issue whose importance is so
well explained by Judge Wilkinson.2 1 Alas, as Rehnquist observes, the
counting of votes in presidential elections suffers from the fact that
"[t] he Constitution was silent as to who would do the counting. ' 22
20. See, e.g., James Monroe, The Hayes-Tilden Electoral Commission, 72 Atlantic
Monthly 521 (1893). Monroe wrote that:
[t]he practical question in all men's minds, and on nearly all men's tongues, was,
by whom shall it be decided who has been elected President of the United States?
Who shall determine what are the proper electoral votes, distinguishing between
those that are genuine and those that are spurious? Who shall count the votes
and declare the result?
Id. at 522.
21. SeeJ. Harvie Wilkinson III, Our Structural Constitution, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1687
(arguing that structural issues deserve more emphasis in constitutional analysis).
22. Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 99; see also 5 Cong. Rec. 896 (1877) (statement of
Sen. Morton) (remarking that "the framers of the Constitution anticipated none of this
trouble"); Milton Harlow Northrup, A Grave Crisis in American History: The Inner
History of the Origin and Formation of the Electoral Commission of 1877, 62 Century
Mag. 923, 923 (1901) ("In vain men turned to the Constitution for light and help. On the
subject of disputed votes for President of the United States that instrument was dumb.").
Rehnquist was referring to the competing theories of who counts electoral votes, but the
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The supporters of Hayes and Tilden relied upon different constitu-
tional provisions that would entrust the counting of the electoral votes to
the supporters of their respective candidates. If no candidate receives a
majority of the electoral votes, Article II of the Constitution charges the
House of Representatives with electing the President, providing that "the
Votes shall be taken by States, the Representation from each State having
one Vote."23 Tilden and congressional Democrats believed that the
House should simply vote according to this provision, for both the House
and the majority of state delegations within the House were within Demo-
cratic control.2 4 But the Twelfth Amendment, approved in 1804 after the
contested election of 1800, directs the President of the Senate "in the
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives [to] open all the
certificates and the votes shall then be counted."2 5 Republicans claimed
that the President of the Senate possessed the responsibility for choosing
among the competing certificates that were presented from Florida, Loui-
siana, Oregon, and South Carolina. That would leave the decision to
Thomas W. Ferry, a Republican senator from Michigan who had become
the Senate's president upon the death of Vice President Henry Wilson in
1875. The parties insisted upon the correctness of their conflicting posi-
tions, and the resulting stalemate created profound anxiety throughout
the nation and even fear of another civil war.
26
Constitution is no more expansive regarding the state institutions charged with counting
the popular votes in presidential elections.
23. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
24. According to Morris, "Samuel Tilden devoted most of his energy in the month of
December [1876] to overseeing the preparation of a massive, book-length study of
previous presidential elections[,] The Presidential Counts," which defended the right of the
House to decide the election. Morris, supra note 5, at 203-04; see also 2 The Writings and
Speeches of SamuelJ. Tilden 386-452 Uohn Bigelow ed., 1885) [hereinafter Writings and
Speeches] (reprinting Tilden's historical study of "Who Counts the Electoral Vote?"). The
Democrats had taken control of the House with a landslide victory in the congressional
elections of 1874. See Rehnquist, supra note 5, at 27. Additionally, between 1865 and
1873, Congress counted electoral votes pursuant to a joint rule that required both the
House and the Senate to concur in any objections to a particular electoral vote, but that
rule was repealed before the election of 1876. Id. at 100. Morris adds that the Twelfth
Amendment further provides that the Senate elects the vice president if the electoral
college fails to do so. In 1877, the Republicans held a majority in the Senate, so William A.
Wheeler-who ran with Hayes-would have become vice president under President
Tilden. See Morris, supra note 5, at 201 n.*. The same scenario could have occurred if the
election of 2000 had been sent to the Congress, with the House electing President Bush
and the Senate electing Vice President Lieberman. See Greene, supra note 14, at 176.
25. U.S. Const. amend. XII.
26. See Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 248 ("Until Congress passed the law creating the
Electoral Commission, realistic threats of violence-of armed partisans marching on
Washington-were heard from several quarters."). Rehnquist also quotes the conclusion
that historian James Ford Rhodes reached in 1906: "The mass of adherents on each side,
which was clearly indicated by the closeness of the vote in many Northern States, shows
what a terrible internecine conflict would have followed a bloody affray of the floor of
Congress." Id. at 109 (quoting 7 James Ford Rhodes, History of the United States 243
(1906)).
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Rehnquist and Morris demonstrate the failure of all the efforts to
achieve an accepted resolution of the presidential election of 1876. None
of the players charged with resolving the election of 1876 acquitted him-
self well. More tellingly, none of the institutions that had an opportunity
to judge the election succeeded in doing so in a manner that settled the
question in the popular mind. The stories told by Rehnquist and Morris
about the election feature distinct institutions that were in a position to
resolve the election: local election officials, state canvassing boards, state
court judges, federal court judges, the specially created Electoral Com-
mission, and Congress. Each failed in turn.
A. Local Election Officials
The initial counting of the popular vote was conducted by the local
precinct and county officials in each state. In Florida in 1876, for exam-
ple, the process worked like this:
First, the people vote at various places in the counties. At sunset
on election day the precinct polls, as these voting places are
called, are closed. The precinct officers count the votes, certify
the result and forward that certificate together with the ballots
of each precinct to the county seat. When all the precincts of
the county are in, a county canvassing board certifies the total
result shown by all the precinct reports. This certificate is then
sent to the seat of State government, and the ballots themselves
are filed at the seat of the county.
2 7
Moreover, as Tilden himself explained, neither the local precinct of-
ficials nor the county officials "has any power or duty but that which is
most purely and simply ministerial. They can merely compute from the
documents before them, and in their respective returns report the re-
sult.' '28 The work of these local officials escaped most of the controversy
in 1876, and neither Morris nor Rehnquist emphasizes them.
B. State Canvassing Boards
State law creates canvassing boards-also known as returning
boards-that are charged with reviewing the local returns and determin-
ing how many votes each candidate receives in an election. Those state
canvassing boards were quite new in 1876.29 Neither Rehnquist nor Mor-
27. Elbert William R. Ewing, History and Law of the Hayes-Tilden Contest Before the
Electoral Commission: The Florida Case, 1876-77, at 13 (1910).
28. Writings and Speeches, supra note 24, at 469.
29. Jeremiah Black, the former Attorney General of the United States who served as
one of Tilden's counsels before the Electoral Commission, painted a dim view of the new
state canvassing boards:
As early as 1870, and before that, the handwriting was seen on the wall which
announced that a large and decisive majority of all the votes, black and white, had
determined to break up this den of thieves [of corrupt Republicans ruling
Southern state governments]. They must therefore prepare for flight or
punishment, unless they could contrive a way of defeating the popular will
2004] 1739
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ris has any praise for the activities of the boards that counted the presi-
dential votes in Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina in 1876. Charges
of partisanship, incompetence, and attempted bribes abounded. In Loui-
siana, "Tilden's electors had leads of an)where from 6,300 to 8,957 votes"
when the state canvassing board began to review the local returns.3 0 The
Republicans, however, insisted that the Tilden votes had been fraudu-
lently exaggerated, and more importantly, that Democratic intimidation
denied scores of African Americans their votes. Morris relates that 157
witnesses testified before the board about Democratic abuses, testimony
the board believed despite the later indications described by Morris that
the claims were fictitious:3 '
Citing "systematic intimidation, murder, and violence toward
one class of voters, white as well as black, of such a character as
to have scarcely a parallel in the history of this state," the board
threw out the entire votes from East Feliciana and Grant par-
ishes, as well as sixty-nine partial returns from twenty-two other
parishes.
3 2
Altogether, the board disallowed 13,211 votes for Tilden and only 2,412
votes for Hayes, thereby allowing Hayes to overcome Tilden's initial lead
and carry the state's eight electoral votes.
33
The result was the same in the other two disputed states. In South
Carolina, the state canvassing board devoted most of its attention to the
governor's race and to the elections to the state legislature, which "was
empowered to declare the winner of the gubernatorial contest."3 4 Hayes
held "a narrow margin" in the presidential elector voting, which he re-
tained after the canvassing board completed its work.3 5 The Florida
board acted after Hayes had been declared the victor in Louisiana and
South Carolina, so everyone understood the sudden importance of the
state's three electoral votes. 3 6 Morris explains that "[t]he chief difficulty
whenever and however it should be expressed. Then the Returning Board was
invented.
This was a machine entirely new, with powers never before given to any
tribunal in any State. Its object was not to return, but to suppress, the votes of the
qualified electors, or change them to suit the occasion.
J.S. Black, The Electoral Conspiracy, 125 N. Am. Rev. 1, 11-12 (1877).
30. Morris, supra note 5, at 176.
31. Id. at 187.
32. Id. at 191-92. Morris explains that "Louisiana law gave the returning board the
absolute authority to decide which votes to count and, more important, which votes to
throw out." Id. at 185. Further, "[i]n both the gubernatorial election of 1872 and the
legislative election of 1874, the board had shamelessly overturned apparent Democratic
majorities, causing a controversy that reached all the way to the White House." Id. at 149.
33. Id. at 182.
34. Id. at 180. Morris provides an extremely lucid explanation of the battle for the
South Carolina governorship. See id. at 174-75, 179-83, 197, 202-03, 214-15, 245.
35. Id. at 180.
36. A vivid illustration of why Florida was allotted only three electoral votes-in
contrast to the state's twenty-five electoral votes in the 2000 election-is seen in "sparsely
populated Dade County, whose announced totals of nine votes for Hayes and five for
1740 [Vol. 104:1732
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facing the canvassing board was the sheer closeness of the numbers,
which were subject to challenge-and manipulation-by both sides."
3 7
The board's initial count gave Hayes a forty-three vote lead, which pro-
duced newspaper headlines throughout the country announcing Hayes
as the new President. Tilden then took a ninety-four vote lead when cor-
rected returns were substituted for Baker County.38 Democrats contin-
ued to insist upon the exclusion of 219 Hayes votes allegedly added after
the polls closed in Alachua County,3 9 and one leading Republican ob-
server-"twice-wounded Civil War hero" General Francis Barlow-agreed
with them until national Republican officials recalled him from the
state. 40 The board kept the 219 votes from Alachua County, and it "ruled
in favor of the Republicans" with respect to "[a] llegations [that] ranged
from ballot-tampering to illegal participation by black juveniles to im-
properly filed returns."41 Thus, shortly after midnight on December 6-
the date federal law set for the meeting of the electoral college-the Flor-




State courts played a relatively modest role in resolving the 1876 elec-
tion, especially when compared to the litigation in the Florida courts 124
years later. In both Florida and South Carolina, the state canvassing
boards were sued by the disappointed gubernatorial candidates and presi-
dential electors. In December 1876, the Florida Supreme Court ruled in
favor of George Drew, the Democratic candidate for governor, holding
that the canvassing board had wrongfully disregarded allegedly fraudu-
lent returns. 43 The Tilden electors then filed a quo warranto action in
Florida state court as soon as the state canvassing board certified Hayes as
Tilden brought peals of laughter from both sides of the room" where the canvassing board
met. Id. at 193-94; see also Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 104 (noting that in 1876 "[tlhe
population of Key West was 10,000; Jacksonville a little under 7,000; Tallahassee just over
2,000; and Tampa less than 1,000," while "Miami would not even become an incorporated
city until 1896").
37. Morris, supra note 5, at 192.
38. Id. at 194.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 195. Morris notes that the ballot box containing the 219 questionable votes
had been kept overnight in the home of the local Republican county chairman, who later
declined a Republican invitation to testify about the matter lest the party lose its claim to
the votes. Additionally, "two poll inspectors admitted later that they had been bribed to
sign the erroneous returns." Id. at 192.
41. Id. at 196.
42. Id. at 197.
43. See State ex rel. Drew v. McLin, 16 Fla. 17, 49 (1876) (holding that "[wihether
irregularities or fraud in an election will authorize the rejection of a vote cast, counted and
returned in a genuine, bonafide return, is a question of law not within the power of this
Board to determine"); see also id. at 61-63 (subsequent opinion of the court rejecting the
board's "protest" of the court's decision).
17412004]
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the winner. 44 They "obtained a ruling from a state trial court that they
were the ones properly chosen,' '4 5 but the Republicans appealed and the
effect of the trial court's decision soon became a contested issue before
the federal Electoral Commission.4 6 In South Carolina, the state su-
preme court issued an order "to prohibit the [canvassing] board from
doing anything other than merely sanction the existing vote totals" in the
state legislative elections. 4 7 The board ignored the court's order, so the
court ordered the arrest of the board members for contempt of court,
but the members were quickly released by a federal writ of habeas
corpus.48 In Rhode Island, where Hayes won an easy victory in the popu-
lar vote, the state supreme court ruled in late November 1876 that a
Hayes elector was disqualified because he already held another federal
office-to wit, a commissioner of the United States Centennial Commis-
sion-but the court rejected the suggestion that the elector's position
went to the Tilden elector who had come in second in the voting. In-
stead, the court held that state law vested the authority to replace the




The federal courts had even less of an impact upon the resolution of
the 1876 election than the state courts. The statute establishing the Elec-
toral Commission expressly preserved the right of any affected party to
initiate litigation arising from the presidential election in federal court.
50
Even so, for reasons that remain unknown, there was no federal litigation
44. Quo warranto is "[a] common-law writ used to inquire into the authority by which
a public office is held or a franchise is claimed." Black's Law Dictionary 1285 (8th ed.
2004); see also Ewing, supra note 27, at 117-30 (defending the propriety of the use of quo
warranto to determine Florida's electors in 1876).
45. Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 106.
46. See 7 Charles Fairman, History of the Supreme Court of the United States: Five
Justices and the Electoral Commission of 1877, at 62 (Supp. 1988) (noting that "on
December 6-the day when the Hayes electors cast their votes-an information in quo
warranto had been brought in the circuit court for Leon County by the four who claimed
to have been elected to vote for Tilden"); id. at 66 (adding that a judgment in the quo
warranto case was issued "almost two months later," and "an appeal was pending" while the
Electoral Commission met in February 1877).
47. Morris, supra note 5, at 180-81.
48. Id. at 181-82; cf. State ex rel. Barker v. Bowen, 8 S.C. 400, 408 (1877) (dismissing
a quo warranto action brought by South Carolina's Tilden electors).
49. See In re Corliss, 11 R.I. 638 (1876).
50. See Act of Jan. 29, 1877, ch. 37, § 6, 19 Stat. 227, 229, which provides that
nothing in this act shall be held to impair or affect any right now existing under
the Constitution and laws to question, by proceeding in the judicial courts of the
United States, the right or title of the person who shall be declared elected, or
who shall claim to be President or Vice-President of the United States, if any such
right exists.
Id. During the debate on the Electoral Commission bill, Senator Sherman observed that
"a case might be made on a disputed presidential election to be carried first to the circuit
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in any of the contested states. Rehnquist notes that the Senate debated a
proposed constitutional amendment that would have authorized the Su-
preme Court to decide the election. 5 1 Toward that end, former Missouri
Senator Carl Schurz wrote Hayes that "the result will be accepted as legal,
just and legitimate by every American citizen," if the Supreme Court
counted the votes. 52 But the proposal failed. On the other hand, federal
judges, as opposed to federal courts, came to play a key role in deciding
who would serve as the next President.
E. The Electoral Commission
The parties immediately disputed the correct constitutional proce-
dure for the counting of the electoral votes when the lame-duck 46th
Congress convened on December 4, 1876.53 The first effort to break the
stalemate occurred on December 7, when George W. McCrary, a Republi-
can from Iowa, introduced a resolution calling for the creation of a com-
mittee to resolve the crisis. McCrary's resolution asserted that
[i]t is of the utmost importance that all differences of opinion
and all doubt and uncertainty upon these questions should be
removed, to the end that the votes may be counted and the re-
sult declared by a tribunal whose authority none can question
and whose decision all will accept as final.
5 4
The House quickly agreed, as did the Senate, and in early January
the two committees began working together to devise a mechanism for
court of the United States and then, by appeal, to the Supreme Court of the United
States." 5 Cong. Rec. 821 (1877) (statement of Sen. Sherman). On the other hand,
if any such right existed, the Supreme Court of the United States was disqualified
from acting thereon as the highest branch of the Federal judiciary, by virtue of
the fact that five of its nine members sat with, deliberated upon the questions
which came before, voted with, and adjudicated with the Commission.
Ewing, supra note 27, at 39.
51. See Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 114; see also, e.g., 5 Cong. Rec. 113-29, 140-44
(1876) (debating proposals to authorize the Supreme Court to decide the presidential
election). Another alternative would have been to organize a new Article III court "to try
this very case." 5 Cong. Rec. 820 (1877) (statement of Sen. Sherman).
52. See Morris, supra note 5, at 212 (quoting Schurz).
53. The lame-duck nature of the Congress did not cause many problems, thus
averting the issues that plagued the lame-duck Sixth House that elected Thomas Jefferson
in February 1801. See John Copeland Nagle, The Lame Ducks of Marbury, 20 Const.
Comment. 317, 323 (2003).
54. 5 Cong. Rec. 91 (1876). Morris quotes only the part of McCrary's resolution that
describes the duty of the committee, see Morris, supra note 5, at 202, omitting the telling
language quoted above about the need for the committee. The antecedents of a special
commission can be seen in an unsuccessful 1800 Federalist proposal to have the Chief
Justice chair a "Grand Committee" given "power to examine and finally decide all disputes"
about presidential elections. A.M. Gibson, A Political Crime: The History of the Great
Fraud 21 (New York, William S. Gottsberger 1885). See generally Northrup, supra note 22,
at 923 (giving account of "the inner history of the origin and formation of the Electoral




resolving the impasse. The joint committee "immediately began discuss-
ing plans to name an independent Electoral Commission to adjudicate
the crisis and decide who should be the next president. ' 55 The consen-
sus in favor of a special independent commission soon became mired in
the determination of the commission's membership. Each proposal to
staff the commission with various combinations of members of Congress
and Supreme Court Justices was scrutinized for any indication of the ulti-
mate decision that the commission would be likely to produce. Moreo-
ver, neither Tilden nor Hayes approved of the commission, preferring to
rest upon the force of their respective constitutional claims to the presi-
dency. Tilden particularly objected to a proposal to select the Supreme
CourtJustices by lot, remarking that "I may lose the presidency, but I will
not raffle for it."
56
Finally, on January 17, 1877, the joint committee agreed upon an
electoral commission that would include five senators, five representa-
tives, and five members of the Supreme Court. The ten congressional
members were evenly divided among Democrats and Republicans. 57 So
were four of the Supreme Court members who were identified by their
circuit: Justices Clifford and Field were Democrats (appointed by Presi-
dents Buchanan and Lincoln, respectively) while Justices Miller and
Strong were Republicans (both appointed by President Lincoln). The
statute empowered those four justices to select a fifth justice who would
serve as the fifteenth member of the commission.58 Justice Davis was sup-
posed to have been the fifth member of the commission because he was
widely-though not universally-viewed as an independent. Morris
writes that "[n]o one, perhaps not even Davis himself, knew which presi-
dential candidate he preferred."59 With that understanding, Congress
approved the bill to establish the commission, and President Grant
55. Morris, supra note 5, at 213.
56. Id. at 216; Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 115.
57. See Act of Jan. 29, 1877, ch. 37, § 2, 19 Stat. 227, 228 (describing the procedure
for the appointment of the members of the Electoral Commission). The congressional
members of the Electoral Commission included
Democratic representatives Eppa Hunton of Virginia, Henry Payne of Ohio, and
Josiah Abbott of Massachusetts; Democratic senators Thomas Bayard of Delaware
and Allen Thurman of Ohio; Republican representatives James A. Garfield of
Ohio and George Hoar of Massachusetts; [and] Republican senators George
Edmunds of Vermont, Frederick T. Frelinghuysen of New Jersey, and Oliver
Morton of Indiana.
Morris, supra note 5, at 219.
58. See Act of Jan. 29, 1877, ch. 37, § 3, 19 Stat. at 228 (providing that the Electoral
Commission shall include "the associate justices of the Supreme Court of the United States
now assigned to the first, third, eighth, and ninth circuits" and that those justices "shall
select, in such manner as a majority of them shall deem fit, another of the associate justices
of said court"). Chapter 7 of Rehnquist's book is devoted to a biographical sketch of each
of the justices who served on the Electoral Commission. See Rehnquist, supra note 4, at
143-62.
59. Morris, supra note 5, at 218.
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signed it into law on January 29. Morris notes that "[m]ost Democrats in
Congress voted for the bill (186 for and 18 against), while most Republi-
cans voted against it (85 against, 52 for)," but he does not adequately
explain why. 60 Perhaps the best explanation is that "[m]ost Democrats
welcomed the Electoral Commission bill, perceiving that it provided
Tilden's only chance to be President." 61 By contrast, Hayes insisted that
the commission was unconstitutional. 6 2 Whatever the motivation, "the
Electoral Commission scheme was generally regarded as a Democratic
victory."63
The Democratic hopes were dashed on the very day that Congress
approved the bill: Justice Davis accepted an appointment to the United
States Senate that was offered by the Democratic state legislature of Illi-
nois, and so he declined to serve on the commission. ChiefJustice Waite
had already been ruled out by the Democrats, so the four Justices on the
60. Id. To be sure, Morris is not alone in his inability to explain why congressional
Democrats supported the creation of the Electoral Commission. Tilden's biographer,
writing in 1895, commented that
[h]ow so large a number of the Democrats in Congress were induced to
supersede the constitutional machinery for counting the electoral votes, for a
device not only unknown to the Constitution, but in all its important bearings
inconsistent with it, can only be explained as we explain most of the blunders
which are woven into the web of every human life. Some yielded through
ignorance, some for want of reflection, some to quiet a controversy about the
result of which they were indifferent or apprehensive, some to serve personal
ends at home that seemed more important to them than the presidential issue,
while upon others, many, if not all, these considerations may have been not
without their influence.
John Bigelow, The Life of SamuelJ. Tilden 63 (New York, Harper & Bros. 1895); see also
Gibson, supra note 54, at 38 (claiming that "[t]he strangest thing, probably, that ever
occurred in political history was the acceptance by Democratic senators and
Representatives of the rehabilitated Federal device of 1800 to count out the candidates the
people had selected and to count in the ones the people had repudiated").
61. Michael Les Benedict, Southern Democrats in the Crisis of 1876-1877: A
Reconsideration of Reunion and Reaction, 46J. S. Hist. 489, 509 (1980). The subsequent
Democratic spin insisted that "[t]he Democrats consented to this in the belief that no
seven Republicans could be taken from the Court or from Congress who would swear to
decide the truth and then uphold a known fraud." Black, supra note 29, at 23-24.
62. See Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 116 (indicating that Hayes viewed the commission
as an unconstitutional interference with the Senate's prerogative to determine which votes
to count); Diary Entry (Jan. 21, 1877), in 3 Hayes Diary and Letters, supra note 1, at 404
(writing that "[t]he leading constitutional objection to it, perhaps, is that the appointment
of the Commission by act of Congress violates that part of the Constitution which gives the
appointment of all other officers 'to the President'").
63. Louis W. Koenig, The Election That Got Away, Am. Heritage, Oct. 1960, at 6, 99.
Thus, comments another observer,
[i]f it was wrong to leave questions to a commission, it was a Democratic wrong.
If the mode of choosing the commissioners in the House and Senate was a
blunder, it was a Democratic blunder.... In a word, if there was fraud anywhere
in the measure, it was the work of an immense majority of the Democrats in both
Houses of Congress.
Monroe, supra note 20, at 537.
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commission selected Justice Bradley for the fifth position. Bradley was a
New Jersey Republican appointed to the Court by President Grant in
1870. Morris insists that "Bradley had a very large skeleton in his closet,"
namely an 1870 circuit court ruling in a railroad bankruptcy case that
favored Tom Scott, who was now busily lobbying federal officials for fund-
ing of a railroad from Texas to the Pacific coast.6 4 But most contempo-
rary observers viewed Bradley as fairminded and nonpartisan.
65
That perception vanished once the commission actually completed
its work. According to the law establishing the commission, on February
1, Congress began counting the electoral votes of each state alphabeti-
cally until it reached the four states-Florida, Louisiana, Oregon, and
South Carolina-for which there were competing sets of electors. The
decision concerning those states was referred to the commission, which
heard lengthy arguments from each side on the legal issues presented in
the case. Generally, the Hayes supporters insisted that the commission
must accept each state's official certification of the canvassing board's de-
termination at face value, while the Tilden advocates "asked the commis-
sion to go behind the returns and investigate the true facts of the case."
66
The statute establishing the commission had provided simply that the
commission had the same power to count the electoral votes that Con-
gress enjoyed under the Constitution. 67 Nonetheless, Morris recounts
the Democratic belief "that a clear majority of the committee [that had
devised the commission] had agreed to the premise 'that the action of
the [Canvassing] Boards must be inquired into and should be reversed if
substantial justice should seem to demand such action,'" a belief that was
not reduced to writing and that "the Republicans now denied."68 Unlike
Morris, most historians have treated the failure to define the powers of
the commission as a conscious congressional decision to finesse the issue
and thus not to prejudge the outcome of the election dispute. As one
writer explained, while debating the Electoral Commission bill, the Sen-
64. Morris, supra note 5, at 219.
65. See Fairman, supra note 46, at 123 (concluding that "[allong with Waite and
Strong, [Bradley] was the least 'political' among the members of the Court"); id. at 124
(quoting a Democratic newspaper in Nashville describing Justice Bradley as "a fair judicial
officer from whom a strictly legal opinion is to be expected on a point of law and a fair
determination upon a matter of fact"); Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 222 (observing that
"Bradley was the closest substitute for a political Independent as could be had among the
remaining members of the Court"); Koenig, supra note 63, at 103 (remarking that
"Bradley's appointment proceeded with the blessings of [Democratic National Committee
chair Abram] Hewitt and even of Tilden"). Rehnquist indicates, however, that not
everyone was convinced of Bradley's impartiality. See Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 159
(quoting a newspaper editorial describing Bradley as "a partisan to whom his party never
looked in vain").
66. Morris, supra note 5, at 221.
67. See Act ofJan. 29, 1877, ch. 37, § 2, 19 Stat. 227, 229 (providing that the Electoral
Commission shall have "the same powers, if any, now possessed ... by the two Houses [of
Congress] acting separately or together").
68. Morris, supra note 5, at 222.
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ate "voted down, during the same hour of one day, two antagonistic pro-
positions upon this subject; namely, the proposition that the Commission
should have the right to go behind the returns from a State, and the
proposition that it should not have such right."69
The ten members of Congress and the four Supreme Court Justices
chosen based upon their political affiliations voted as expected, yielding a
seven-to-seven split. Justice Bradley cast the tie-breaking eighth vote in
favor of the position advanced by Hayes. 70 That vote earned both him,
personally, and the Supreme Court, as an institution, the contempt of
contemporary Democrats and subsequent historians, who denounced the
partisanship of his vote and the entire process. For example, Morris de-
nounces the "fifteen-man Electoral Commission that was every bit as par-
tisan and petty as the shadiest ward heeler in New York City or the most
unreconstructed Rebel in South Carolina."7 1 Rumors emerged that Jus-
tice Bradley had switched his vote after a late-night visit from Republican
leaders the night before. 72 More tellingly, as noted above, Justice Breyer
wrote in his Bush v. Gore dissent that the participation in the work of the
electoral commission by five justices, including Justice Bradley, "did not
lend that process legitimacy. Nor did it assure the public that the process
had worked fairly, guided by the law. Rather, it simply embroiled mem-
bers of the Court in partisan conflict, thereby undermining respect for
the judicial process."
7 3
But Chief Justice Rehnquist is far more forgiving of the episode in
his book, defending both the reasonableness of Justice Bradley's legal
conclusion and the work of the Electoral Commission. Rehnquist cites
"[t]wo contemporaneous sources" that "confirm at least the reasonable-
ness, if not the outright correctness, of Bradley's stance." 74 First, Rehn-
quist quotes Justice Davis-the quintessential independent-as endorsing
Bradley's legal conclusion. Second, Rehnquist reports that a pre-election
congressional debate concerning the counting of electoral votes yielded
"substantive agreement on both sides of the aisle that in its consideration
of an objection Congress could not 'go behind' the certifications sent in
by the states," 75 which is what Tilden requested, but Bradley refused to
69. Monroe, supra note 20, at 526.
70. See Proceedings of the Electoral Commission and of the Two Houses of Congress
in Joint Meeting Relative to the Count of the Electoral Votes Cast December 6, 1876 for
the Presidential Term Commencing March 4, 1877, at 1019-42 (1877) [hereinafter
Electoral Commission Proceedings] (text of Justice Bradley's opinion concerning the
contested states).
71. Morris, supra note 5, at 2.
72. Morris seems to give these rumors some credit in his discussion. See id. at 223-25.
Rehnquist, by contrast, writes at length to exonerate Justice Bradley from any such
improper influences. Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 180-200.
73. 531 U.S. 98, 157 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
74. Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 185.
75. Id. at 185-86.
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allow. Rehnquist also extols the federalism justifications for deferring to
the official electoral decisions of each state:
7 6
Thanks to the Electoral Commission created by Congress and
acquiesced to by Hayes and Tilden, the nation avoided serious
disturbance or bloodshed and went about on its business. This
outcome was a testament to the ability of the American system of
government to improvise solutions to even the most difficult
and important problems.
7 7
Thus Rehnquist concludes his book by expressing his belief that the




Still, the Electoral Commission did not decide the election. It re-
mained for Congress to bless the decision of the commission, which com-
pleted its work just four days before the March 4 date then prescribed in
the Constitution for the new President's inauguration. 79 The statute es-
tablishing the Electoral Commission provided that the commission's deci-
sion would be binding unless both houses of Congress overturned it,8
0
and the Republican majority in the Senate had no intention of doing so.
The Democrats in the House thus lacked the power to reject the commis-
sion's decision, but they retained the ability to filibuster the formal count-
ing of the electoral votes that was necessary to elect Hayes as President.
Morris describes how a spurious second certificate, claiming that Ver-
mont-just four states from the end of the alphabet of states-had cast its
five electors for Tilden, delayed the proceedings for one critical day. 81
And when the House and Senate separated to consider an unsuccessful
challenge to one of the Wisconsin electors for Hayes, a representative
from Texas moved to have the House simply elect Tilden as President
pursuant to the House's powers under Article I-just as Tilden himself
"had been demanding for the past four months. '8 2 The motion was ta-
bled. 83 The count was completed in the early morning hours of Friday,
March 2, but only after frustrated Democrats voiced sentiments such as
76. Id. at 181-83 (stating that the "concept of state sovereignty played an important
role" in the dispute).
77. Id. at 219.
78. Id. at 248.
79. The Twentieth Amendment changed the presidential inauguration date from
March 4 to January 20. See U.S. Const. amend. XX, § 1; John Copeland Nagle, A
Twentieth Amendment Parable, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 470 (1997).
80. See Act of Jan. 29, 1877, ch. 37, § 2, 19 Stat. 227, 229 (providing that Congress
shall count the electoral votes "in conformity" with the Electoral Commission's decision
unless "the two Houses shall separately concur in ordering otherwise").
81. Morris, supra note 5, at 235-36.
82. Id. at 236-37.
83. On March 3, the House passed a resolution declaring that Tilden had been "duly
elected President of the United States," id. at 242, but by then the count had been
completed, and Hayes soon took the oath of office.
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this: "Today is Friday. Upon that day, the savior of the world suffered
crucifixion between two thieves. On this Friday constitutional govern-
ment, justice, honesty, fair dealing, manhood, and decency suffer cruci-
fixion amid a number of thieves."
84
Whether Hayes or his supporters made any deals to convince con-
gressional Democrats to acquiesce in his election has become the stuff of
historical legend. On February 26, several leaders of both parties met at
the Wormley Hotel in Washington to discuss the prospect-and perhaps
the promises-of a Hayes presidency. The popular legend, fueled by C.
Vann Woodward's 1951 book Reunion and Reaction,8 5 suggests Hayes sig-
naled to Southern Democrats that his administration would remove the
hated federal military presence from Southern states, thus returning the
state governments to local control but effectively dooming the new rights
of the recently freed African Americans there. As Morris explains, "a
popular legend has developed of a shadowy cabal of white politicians cyn-
ically selling out the futures of four million black southerners in return
for Rutherford B. Hayes's ascension to the White House," a legend that
"endures, at least in part, because of the irresistible irony of such a plot
being hatched in a hotel owned by one of the wealthiest black entrepre-
neurs in Washington." 86 That view was echoed by a generation of histori-
ans, and perhaps more importantly, one of Rehnquist's predecessors:
Earl Warren, who wrote in 1972 that "the compromisers of the Hayes-
Tilden affair totally abandoned the group on whose behalf the Civil War
had been fought and the Reconstruction amendments enacted. '8 7 Mor-
ris, however, concludes that "Hayes, whatever his faults, would never have
agreed to such an arrangement, particularly when the scent of victory was
in the air .... Like many other high-level political deals, the Wormley
84. Id. at 237 (quoting Kentucky congressman Joseph C. Blackburn).
85. C. Vann Woodward, Reunion and Reaction: The Compromise of 1877 and the
End of Reconstruction 3-22 (1951).
86. Morris, supra note 5, at 234.
87. Earl Warren, Notre Dame Law School Civil Rights Lectures, 48 Notre Dame Law.
14, 36 (1972). Nor was ChiefJustice Warren the onlyjudge to casually accept Woodward's
hypothesis. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 120 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(referring to "the Compromise of 1877, when the Republican Party agreed effectively to
end Reconstruction and to withdraw federal troops from the South in return for Southern
acquiescence in the decision of the Electoral Commission that awarded the disputed 1876
presidential election to Rutherford B. Hayes"); Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d
1554, 1580 n.28 (5th Cir. 1984) (Wisdom, J., dissenting) (citing Woodward and asserting
that President Hayes's removal of federal troops from the South, his presidential
appointments, and contemporary congressional legislation "raise the inference that the
compromise extended beyond the removal of federal support of Republican regimes in
Louisiana and South Carolina as a quid pro quo for the blessing given President
Rutherford B. Hayes"); Builders Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 298 F. Supp. 2d 725, 726 (N.D. Ill.
2003) (writing that "the Tilden-Hayes election of 1876 and judicial acceptance of the
separate-but-equal doctrine led to almost a century of segregation of African Americans
and their exclusion from the mainstream of American society").
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agreement was more a mutual concession of the obvious than a device for
controlling larger events."8 8
G. Other Alternatives
Several other means of resolving the contested presidential election
of 1876 were discussed but not employed. One possibility was for either
Hayes or Tilden to relinquish his claim to the presidency, but that sugges-
tion does not appear to have been taken seriously by either candidate or
his supporters.8 9 Alternatively, several observers proposed that a new
election be held to produce the definitive result that had failed to emerge
from the voting on November 6.90 New elections are a common remedy
when the results of the original election are hopelessly uncertain or de-
monstrably fraudulent. 9 1 But no such proposal gained any traction in
1876 and early 1877, and neither Rehnquist nor Morris even mentions
that as a possible solution. A third possibility would have been to decide
the election by lot. The closest the discussions in 1876 came to that idea
was the proposal to choose the members of the Electoral Commission by
lot, but Tilden quickly rejected that idea.92 It is baffling to imagine the
presidency being determined by lot, yet state law sometimes provides for
precisely that device for deciding tied elections for other offices today.
93
88. Morris, supra note 5, at 234.
89. For example, a Hayes biographer reports that one of Hayes's closest college
friends
thought that Hayes and Tilden should meet as gentlemen, face to face, secretly,
and decide between themselves who should have the office. But that kind of
solution, like many another, was sophomoric. ... The office of President of the
United States was not to be filled as if it were the same as choosing the head of
the Nu Pi Kappa at old Kenyon [Hayes's alma mater].
Barnard, supra note 1, at 337 (footnote omitted).
90. See Walker Lewis, The Hayes-Tilden Election Contest (pt. 2), 47 A.B.A.J. 163, 166
(1961) (suggesting that "there might be a new election" if the electoral count was not
completed by March 4); Northrup, supra note 22, at 925 (listing "the propriety of a new
election" as one of the topics to be considered by the House committee charged with
identifying the best means for resolving the 1876 presidential election dispute); cf. Diary
Entry (Mar. 16, 1877), in 3 Hayes Diary and Letters, supra note 1, at 427, 428 (listing "[a]
new election" as one of four possibilities for resolving the situation in Louisiana and South
Carolina).
91. See generally Samuel Issacharoffet al., The Law of Democracy: Legal Structure of
the Political Process 1038-46 (rev. 2d ed. 2002) (discussing cases ordering new elections).
92. See Morris, supra note 5, at 216; Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 115; see also
Northrup, supra note 22, at 927 (indicating that congressional Democrats would never
"consent that the great office of President should be raffled off like a Thanksgiving
turkey").
93. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 105.051(1)(c) (West 2002) ("If the vote at the general
election results in a tie, the outcome shall be determined by lot."); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 1-13-
11 (Michie 2003) ("In the event of a tie vote between any candidates in the election for the
same office, the determination as to which of the candidates shall be declared to have been
nominated or elected shall be decided by lot."); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 5.01(4) (a) (West 2004)
("If 2 or more candidates for the same office receive the greatest, but an equal number of
votes, the winner shall be chosen by lot. . . ."); cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Note, Choosing
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The final means of deciding the election was the one that all rejected
but all feared: The threat of a violent resolution of the conflict pervaded
the times. In the words of historian James Ford Rhodes, "[s]ome Sena-
tors and Representatives derided the idea of danger; but anyone, who
lived through those days in an observing and reflecting mood, or anyone,
who will now make a careful study of the contemporary evidence, cannot
avoid the conviction that the country was on the verge of civil war."'94
Happily, "aside from an anonymous shot through Hayes's parlor window,
no violence was displayed throughout the entire crisis."9 5 But the fear of
a violent resolution of the contested election animated the efforts to find
an alternative solution.
Of course, the difficulty in resolving the disputed election could have
been avoided by not holding an election. The Constitution does not
mandate that the President of the United States be selected by a popular
election.9 6 One state did not hold a presidential election in 1876: Colo-
rado. As Morris relates, Congress approved Colorado's admission as a
state on August 1, 1876,just three months before the election. Moreover,
"[t]o spare the cost of holding two separate elections less than a month
apart, Congress had already authorized the new legislature to choose the
state's presidential electors." 97 The Republicans won the election to de-
Representatives by Lottery Voting, 93 Yale L.J. 1283 (1984) (proposing a system where the
winner would be chosen by a random drawing from ballots cast, allowing greater
protection of minority rights; a candidate garnering 60% of the popular vote would have a
60% chance of winning overall, but the candidate with 40% of the popular vote would still
have a chance to win).
94. Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 109 (quoting 7 Rhodes, supra note 26, at 231); see also
Diary Entry (Mar. 14, 1877), in 3 Hayes Diary and Letters, supra note 1, at 425, 427 (diary
entry from President Hayes's first week in office stating that "I do not think the wise policy
is to decide contested elections in the States by use of the national army"); Brooks D.
Simpson, Ulysses S. Grant and the Electoral Crisis of 1876-1877, Hayes Hist. J., Winter
1992, at 5, 13 (indicating that President Grant "sincerely believed that the Democrats were
trying to do on the national level what they had successfully accomplished in several
Southern states-subvert the electoral process through terrorism").
95. Allan Peskin, Was There a Compromise of 1877?, 60J. Am. Hist. 63, 73 (1973).
96. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (per curiam) ("The individual citizen
has no federal constitutional right to vote for electors for the President of the United
States unless and until the state legislature chooses a statewide election as the means to
implement its power to appoint members of the electoral college.").
97. Morris, supra note 5, at 156. The story gets even more interesting beyond what
Morris reports. Democrat Thomas Patterson owed his election as Colorado's territorial
representative to Congress in 1874 to a split within the Republican ranks between
supporters ofJerome Chaffee of Denver and Henry Moore Teller of Golden. "Chaffee had
enjoyed a close personal relationship with President Ulysses S. Grant's territorial
appointees. However, an apparent breakdown in the relationship occurred after Chaffee
reportedly quarreled with Grant over a poker game, and the president began to remove
Chaffee's friends from their influential positions." Robert E. Smith, Thomas M. Patterson,
Colorado Statehood, and the Presidential Election of 1876, 50 Colo. Mag. 153, 154 (1976).
In response, Chaffee "called for statehood for Colorado to eliminate the influence of the
president on territorial affairs." Id. at 155. Patterson exploited the Republican party's
divisions in 1874 to become "the first Democratic territorial delegate to go to Congress
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termine control of the state's legislature, and that legislature awarded
Colorado's three electoral votes to Hayes, without which he would have
lost the election. Those three votes might not have existed because
"[t]he Democratic majority in the U.S. House of Representatives could
have easily delayed Colorado's admission until after the presidential elec-
tion, but the party was misled by the territory's lone congressional dele-
gate, fellow Democrat Thomas Patterson, who assured them that the state
would vote Democratic in 1876."98
III. CRITERIA FOR CHOOSING WHO SHOULD COUNT VOTES
The subtitle of Morris's book refers to "the stolen election of 1876,"
yet Morris never identifies who stole the election or how a similar theft
could be avoided in the future. The failure of each of the institutions
involved in the resolution of the 1876 presidential election is echoed in
the similar charges leveled in 2000. Such contested elections demand an
institutional structure that possesses the popular confidence to resolve
them. With considerable understatement, Rehnquist writes that "[t]here
was profound dissatisfaction with the process on the part of the losing
parties in both 2000 and 1876." 99 He then adds, "Perhaps when such a
dispute erupts, there is no means of resolving it that will satisfy both
sides."10 0 I am not yet prepared to surrender to such a pessimistic conclu-
sion. Elections for government officials, popular initiatives, corporate
boards, and countless other public and private matters are decided all the
from Colorado." Id. at 157. Once there, Patterson persuaded eleven House Democrats to
join the House Republicans to produce the two-thirds majority necessary for Congress to
pass the Colorado Enabling Act in early 1875. Id. at 159. The voters of Colorado approved
statehood on July 1, 1876, and President Grant proclaimed Colorado a state on August 1.
See Proclamation No. 6, 19 Stat. 665 (1876). Then, in October 1876, the Republicans
swept nearly two-thirds of the seats in the election for the new state legislature. See The
State of Colorado, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1876, at 7 (reporting that the Republicans had won
32 of 49 House seats and either 19 or 20 of 26 Senate seats). The legislature promptly
chose three electors for Hayes. But the saga did not quite end there, for the New York
Times warned in early December that
[i]t seems probable that the House will begin its efforts at confusion with the
Presidential election by trying to deprive Colorado of its character as a State.
Some quibble has been invented regarding an informality in the Enabling act,
and on the strength of this it is reported that the House will . . . seek to lay the
foundation of a plan for throwing out the Electoral votes of that State.
Editorial, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1876, at 6. Apparently nothing ever materialized of that
threat, for neither Morris nor Rehnquist even mentions it.
98. Morris, supra note 5, at 155-56. The closeness of the 1876 election had other
effects as well. It prompted both political parties to contest every state in the next election,
and the resulting pandering to gain California's six electoral votes in 1880 eventually
helped produce the Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (repealed 1943),
which barred Chinese immigration primarily at the behest of racist Californians. See
generally Andrew Gyory, Closing the Gate: Race, Politics, and the Chinese Exclusion Act
(1998).
99. Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 5-6.
100. Id.
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time without the suspicion that plagued the presidential elections of 1876
and 2000. But we have yet to heed the advice that Hayes offered four
days after election day in 1876: "AJI thoughtful people are brought to
consider the imperfect machinery provided for electing the president.
No doubt we shall, warned by this danger, provide, by amendments of the
Constitution, or by proper legislation, against a recurrence of the dan-
ger."10 1  Any more perfect machinery must employ unbiased deci-
sionmakers who are expert in the factual and legal questions that may
arise and able to reach a decision in a timely manner.
A. Bias and Independence
The successful resolution of a contested election must achieve fair-
ness to the parties involved and the appearance of fairness to the general
public. The avoidance of a biased decisionmaker is perhaps the most
fundamental criterion for achieving those goals. The appearance of
bias, in turn, is often linked to the independence of the decisionmaker.
Partisan affiliation was viewed as nearly dispositive of the conclusion that
an individual would reach throughout the 1876 dispute. Even before the
election, Senator Bayard expressed his fear that a colleague was
over-sanguine in supposing that that day of political millennium
has arrived in which he and his party friends, and I and mine,
shall be able to look at facts imbued with all the color of party
feeling, yet decide them as though we were entirely indifferent
to the result of our decision.'
0 2
Charges or assumptions of partisanship attached to each of the institu-
tions that played a role in deciding the presidential election of 1876.
The state canvassing boards elicited the most vociferous complaints
of partisanship. The board members' political affiliations were frequently
noted at the time of the election, and are often mentioned by Rehnquist
and Morris. The South Carolina board consisted of five Republican
elected officials, including three officials "who ultimately would rule on
their own cases" for reelection. l0 3 The Florida board included two
Republicans-the elected Secretary of State and Comptroller-and the
elected Democratic Attorney General. Thus, one writer has asserted that
" [i] n a complete travesty of integrity, the board voted for Hayes by virtue
of its Republican majority."1 0 4 Morris asserts that "the South Carolina
and Florida boards seemed ripe for partisan manipulation" because they
"were composed of generally respected, if partisan, individuals," yet those
101. Diary Entry (Nov. 11, 1876), in 3 Hayes Diary and Letters, supra note 1, at 374,
377.
102. 7 Fairman, supra note 46, at 56 (quoting Sen. Bayard).
103. Morris, supra note 5, at 177.
104. Louis C. Kleber, The Presidential Election of 1876, 20 Hist. Today 807, 811
(1970); see also Koenig, supra note 63, at 100 ("Never deterred by the weight of the
evidence, no matter how overwhelming, the board consistently and ruthlessly used its
discretionary powers in favor of the Republicans.").
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boards "were pillars of Athenian probity and good governance compared
to the Louisiana returning board."1 05 Four Republicans served on the
Louisiana board, and they had neglected their statutory obligation to
name a Democrat to the remaining fifth spot on the board that had been
vacated when the sole Democrat "had resigned two years earlier, charging
the board with rampant corruption. 1 0 6 Rehnquist agrees that "[t]he
composition of the [Louisiana] board was not one to inspire confidence
in the Democrats," and that "there was strong evidence that at least in
Louisiana a partisan returning board had fraudulently disallowed more
than enough returns to deny [Tilden] the state's electoral votes."
10 7
"The charge against the board," explains Rehnquist, "was not simply in-
competence, or negligence, but fraud-deliberate tampering with the re-
turns to produce the outcome desired by the board."10 8 Morris provides
abundant evidence that the members of the canvassing boards in Florida,
South Carolina, and especially Louisiana acted in pursuit of the partisan
interests, which Rehnquist never really denies. 109
The few state courts involved in the 1876 presidential election fared
somewhat better in the court of popular opinion. "Surprisingly," Morris
writes, "the all-Republican" South Carolina state supreme court ruled that
the state canvassing board had wrongfully thrown out thousands of votes
for the Democratic gubernatorial candidate. 1 0 But while the small role
that the courts played in deciding the election generated little contro-
versy, the bitter complaints of partisanship aimed at the five Supreme
Court Justices who sat on the Electoral Commission show that judges
were hardly immune from claims or assumptions of bias.
According to most observers, the Electoral Commission was built
with the expectation that the Democratic and Republican members
would favor Tilden and Hayes, respectively.1 1 1 Even so, it is still striking
105. Morris, supra note 5, at 177-78.
106. Id. at 178.
107. Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 107, 180-81.
108. Id. at 181.
109. See Morris, supra note 5, at 174-99; Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 103-12; see also
Gibson, supra note 54, at 17 (stating that "[i]n each of those states there were Returning
Boards composed of unprincipled men who would not hesitate to do anything necessary to
perpetuate their party in power, provided they were protected and rewarded").
110. Morris, supra note 5, at 180-81.
111. See, e.g., 5 Cong. Rec. 893 (1877) (statement of Sen. Morrill) (objecting to the
"selection of four of the judges according to their ancient political affinities"); id. at 888
(statement of Sen. Christiancy) (stating that many "politicians and partisans in and out of
Congress [assumed] that all the members of the commission . . . will necessarily . . . be
governed in their decision by the partisan views, partisan bias, or partisan prejudices of the
political parties to which they respectively belong"); id. at 868 (statement of Sen. Sargent)
(insisting that "these judges are selected for their political opinions"); id. at 820 (statement
of Sen. Sherman) (arguing that the justices "were selected for their political opinions"); id.
at 800 (statement of Sen. Morton) (claiming that the justices "were chosen by circuits, as I
understand it, not because of geographical distribution, but because of the political
antecedents of the men who preside in those circuits"); Lewis, supra note 90, at 39
(asserting that "[i]mpartiality seems to have been a minor consideration and it was freely
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how casually Chief Justice Rehnquist refers to the partisan affiliation of
the Justices as sufficient evidence of how they would decide the issue in
1876, notwithstanding their sworn obligation to adhere to the law instead
of their own political preferences. For example, he refers to Justice
Strong as "a Republican commissioner."' 1 2 More generally, Rehnquist
concludes that "on the one hand the justices were selected to add to the
Commission a less obviously partisan aura than the congressional mem-
bers, but they were named also with a view that the members of the Court
were not wholly apolitical."1 13 Rehnquist's statements are surprising
given the explicit statutory oath the members of the Electoral Commis-
sion took to "impartially examine and consider all questions submitted to
the commission."' 14 Rehnquist's assumption also contradicts the minor-
ity view expressed during the debates involving the establishment of the
Electoral Commission, which insisted that the Justices of the Supreme
Court would never act in a partisan fashion. Senator Edmunds, for exam-
ple, argued that the Justices "presumably would bring to the discharge of
whatever duty you impose upon them the greatest amount of impartiality
and respect for orderly government that could be found in any tribunal
that might be selected."
1 15
But the members of the commission did not disappoint the major-
ity's expectations, voting 8-7 along party lines. Hayes observed that "the
decision is by a strictly party vote-eight Republicans against seven Demo-
crats! It shows the strength of party ties." 1 6 Justice Bradley, in turn, was
assumed that the Justices would be biased"); Peskin, supra note 95, at 72 (arguing that the
Democrats "could not appeal to the law because the Republicans dominated the Supreme
Court"); George C. Rable, Southern Interests and the Election of 1876: A Reappraisal, 26
Civil War Hist. 347, 357 (1980) (writing that "[t]he Republicans ... had ... the Supreme
Court on their side"). Several similar statements are quoted in Milton Northrup's record
of the deliberations of the committees that created the Electoral Commission. See
Northrup, supra note 22, at 929 (reporting that Abram Hewitt, chair of the Democratic
National Committee, argued that "[t]hose recently appointed on the bench are too fresh
from the domain of politics to have gotten over a natural bias they took with them").
112. Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 170.
113. Id. at 222.
114. Act of Jan. 29, 1877, ch. 37, § 2, 19 Stat. 227, 228.
115. 5 Cong. Rec. 122 (1876) (statement of Sen. Edmunds); see also id. at 898 (1877)
(statement of Sen. Blaine) (arguing that the Supreme Court "would be regarded by men of
all parties as a trustworthy repository" for the election decision because of the Court's
"presumed impartiality"); id. at 888 (statement of Sen. Christiancy) (insisting that the
justices serving on the Electoral Commission "will at once feel the importance, the vital
importance of exercising judicial impartiality"); id. at 878 (statement of Sen. Conkling)
(describing the effort to create "a provisional tribunal ... with impartiality as great as could
be obtained by the instrumentalities of humanity"); id. at 141 (1876) (statement of Sen.
Edmunds) (asking "how is it possible in this Republic to remove further from political bias,
further from excitement, passion, [or] interest" than by entrusting it to the Supreme
Court); Northrup, supra note 22, at 930 (indicating that Senator Thurman "believe [d] that
those who expect partizan [sic] decisions from these judges will be disappointed"); id. at
931 (stating that Senator Bayard concluded that any "estimate that is founded on the
political prejudice of any one of these judges will be found wanting").
116. Diary Entry (Feb. 8, 1877), in 3 Hayes Diary and Letters, supra note 1, at 413-14.
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denounced as a Republican partisan as soon as he voted in favor of the
arguments advanced by Hayes. Rehnquist quotes one newspaper edito-
rial that claimed Justice Bradley "will be known in history as the infamous
eighth man who, without scruple and without shame, cast his vote every
time to uphold the frauds of the Returning Boards, and violently contra-
dicted his own positions to maintain the corrupt conspiracy."'1 17 For his
part, Bradley himself later wrote
[s]o far as I am capable of judging my own motives, I did not
allow political, that is, party, considerations to have any weight
whatever in forming my conclusion. I know that is difficult for
men of the world to believe this; but I know it, and that is
enough for me.118
Bradley added, "We must take the world as it is, and having done what we
conceived to be our duty, trust the rest to a higher power than that [that]
rules the ordinary affairs of many in society."1 19
True or not, claims of partisanship informed Justice Breyer's dissent
in Bush v. Gore, where he warned that the Supreme Court suffered an
institutional blow from the perceived partisanship of its members.
1 20
There were ample warnings of such a result from congressional oppo-
nents of the establishment of the Electoral Commission. Senator Sher-
man wrote Hayes shortly before Congress approved the commission, stat-
ing that " [t] he worst feature is the degradation of the Supreme Court by
picking out the strongest partisans on both sides and requiring them to
agree upon an umpire."1 21 But Chief Justice Rehnquist defends the ser-
117. Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 187.
118. 7 Fairman, supra note 46, at 194 (quoting an 1882 letter from Bradley to Henry
B. Dawson) (alteration in original).
119. Id. at 195.
120. See 531 U.S. 98, 157-58 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting). For previous judicial
expressions of the same concern, see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 401 n.26
(1989) (quoting Earl Warren, The Memoirs of Earl Warren 356 (1977) (concluding that
"the service of five Justices on the Hayes-Tilden Commission had demeaned" the Court));
Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245, 1263 n.19 (9th Cir. 1988) (asserting that
"[t]he federal judiciary suffered" from the service of the justices on the Electoral
Commission). Nonetheless, it appears questionable that the Court's popular reputation
has suffered since Bush v. Gore, and the Court has certainly disabused any suggestion that it
always defers to the legal arguments of the Bush Administration. See, e.g., Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (holding the Bush Administration's policy of enemy
combatant detention unconstitutional in several respects).
121. Letter from Senator John Sherman to Rutherford B. Hayes (Jan. 18, 1877), in 3
Hayes Diary and Letters, supra note 1, at 404, 405; accord 5 Cong. Rec. 867-68 (1877)
(statement of Sen. Sargent) (arguing that the bill "degrades the Supreme Court and brings
it into contempt" because "we associate in the minds of the people the idea that they are
political judges. We give them to think that these men are partisans"); id. at 161 (1876)
(statement of Sen. Bogy) (arguing that "you would be destroying the Supreme Court by
bringing it into the arena of politics"); id. at 141 (statement of Sen. Merrimon) (worrying
that the proposed commission "would involve the Supreme Court more or less in politics
and political considerations" and "the court will be brought into contempt, and soon lose
much of the moral weight and power that it has on the American mind at this time"); id. at
124 (statement of Sen. Morton) (suggesting that the Supreme Court's involvement in the
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vice of the five justices on the commission nonetheless. He rejects the
accusations of partisanship by Justice Bradley. He recognizes that the ap-
pearance of partisanship may exist regardless of the truth of such
charges. But Rehnquist argues that any institutional harm the Court suf-
fered from the 1876 presidential election was outweighed by the impor-
tance of having the Justices involved in the peaceful resolution of the
election controversy. "They may have tarnished the reputation of the
Court," Rehnquist admits, "but they may also have saved the nation from,
if not widespread violence, a situation fraught with combustible uncer-
tainty. In the view of this author, in accepting membership on the Com-
mission, they did the right thing."
122
Few had any doubt that Congress or the congressional members of
the Electoral Commission would vote along partisan lines. Rehnquist
writes that " [e] ach of them, like SirJoseph Porter in the Gilbert and Sulli-
van opera H.M.S. Pinafore, 'always voted at his party's call,' and no one
was the least bit surprised that they did so."123 Senator Edmunds was
equally blunt, objecting that the congressional members of the Electoral
Commission were "from the very nature of their positions, Senators and
Representatives, more or less partisans, and whose judgments, therefore,
must be, be they as pure as human nature ever is or can be, affected by
the views and wishes they entertain of what they would like to have
done."124 That these assumptions persisted, despite the oath taken by
each member of the Electoral Commission to judge the election dispute
impartially, shows the persistence of claims of partisanship, which, of
course, proved to be correct.
Considerations of the independence of those charged with deciding
a contested election have a prospective element as well. Many Democrats
and subsequent historians have complained that President Hayes re-
warded many of the people who secured his election with federal of-
fices. 125 Morris, for example, describes how Lew Wallace-a Republican
who supervised the count in Florida and who later gained fame as the
author of Ben-Hur-was " [i]n due time ... rewarded for his efforts, being
appointed territorial governor of New Mexico in 1878."126 In fact, an-
other study describes how Wallace became bitter waiting to receive an
electoral dispute would place the Court "in a position where its motives will always be
impugned").
122. Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 248.
123. Id. at 220.
124. 5 Cong. Rec. 122 (1876) (statement of Sen. Edmunds); see also Keith Ian
Polakoff, The Politics of Inertia: The Election of 1876 and the End of Reconstruction 285
(1973) ("There was never any question that the congressional members of the commission
would be strictly partisan in their judgments.").
125. See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 54, at 202-13 (listing the offices to which the
supporters of Hayes were later appointed); Morris, supra note 5, at 243-44 (describing
how some "cabinet appointments went to men who, directly or indirectly, had helped
Hayes successfully press his case before the Electoral Commission").
126. Morris, supra note 5, at 196.
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appointment from President Hayes, and how one was forthcoming only
after Wallace began to wreak havoc with Republican plans to retain a
House seat in his native Indiana.1
27
The need for an unbiased and independent party to judge a con-
tested election presumes that such a party exists. Congress went to ex-
traordinary lengths to establish the Electoral Commission with the hope
that it could rebut any concerns about partisanship, only to see the com-
mission vilified when it ruled along party lines. But imagine what might
have happened ifJustice Davis had served on the commission as had orig-
inally been planned. Davis was regarded as the ideal neutral party: A
Republican appointed by his friend President Lincoln, Davis had since
displayed an interest in the Democratic Party, and he enjoyed "the grace
of impartiality."12 8 Democrats were decidedly more enthusiastic than
Republicans about Davis. 129 "Days were spent" by the joint committee
that designed the Electoral Commission "in hair-splitting discussion of
the political bias of Justice Davis."' 30 But Davis mooted that dispute by
accepting the nomination of Democrats in the Illinois state legislature to
serve in the United States Senate, thus depriving national Democrats of
the key vote on the Electoral Commission and leading the way for Justice
Bradley to replace him there.
127. See Lee Scott Theisen, A "Fair Count" in Florida: General Lew Wallace and the
Contested Presidential Election of 1876, 2 Hayes Hist. J. 21, 26-29 (1978). Morris also
suggests that promises of federal offices helped Hayes to receive the Republican
nomination in the first place. According to Morris, the supporters of Benjamin Bristow's
presidential aspirations were induced to shift their allegiance to Hayes during the
Republican convention via a deal that "was finalized with the confidential proffer of a
Supreme Court nomination for Bristow's floor manager, John M. Harlan." Morris, supra
note 5, at 77; see also id. at 79-80 (describing how Harlan, "his Supreme Court
nomination stashed safely in his back pocket," soon delivered Kentucky's votes to Hayes).
128. Monroe, supra note 20, at 528. See generally Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 132-42
(providing a biographical sketch of Justice Davis).
129. Rehnquist quotes Milton Northrup's account of the joint committee's discussion
of Justice Davis:
The Republicans tenaciously argued that Justice Davis was, to all intents and
purposes, a Democrat, and that his selection should be charged up against the
Democrats. Just as strenuously the Democratic committeemen insisted that he
occupied a midway position between the parties, and therefore could with entire
propriety serve as the fifth wheel of the commission coach.
Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 118 (quoting Northrup, supra note 22, at 927). But see Henry
Watterson, The Hayes-Tilden Contest for the Presidency: Inside History of a Great
Political Crisis, 86 Century Mag. 3, 18 (1913) (article written by a former Democratic
Representative stating that "[t]he day after the inauguration of Hayes my kinsman, [and
future justice] Stanley Matthews, said to me, 'You people wanted Judge Davis. So did we. I
tell you what I know, that judge Davis was as safe for us as Judge Bradley. We preferred
him because he carried more weight."').
130. Northrup, supra note 22, at 933.
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B. Expertise
Expertise is another important consideration in selecting the appro-
priate party to decide an election. Modern administrative agencies, for
example, are designed to exploit the expertise of their officials in per-
forming the task delegated to them. Election canvassing boards may op-
erate in the same way, relying upon the assumption that the members of
the board are sufficiently familiar with the kinds of questions that arise in
the context of questionable votes and elections. On the other hand, ju-
ries decide factual questions in most legal disputes even though most citi-
zens lack any special training in such matters, so it is conceivable that
juries could be called upon in disputed elections as well. Moreover, no
amount of expertise or training would equip any decisionmaker to an-
swer questions for which the evidence is unavailable. The imperfect ma-
chinery for collecting and counting votes complicated all of the efforts to
decide the presidential elections of 1876 and 2000, as well as countless
other less prominent elections.
Many of the questions that arose in the context of the 1876 presiden-
tial election were questions of law. As described by Rehnquist, Justice
Bradley's decisive vote rested upon careful legal reasoning:
[Bradley] stated that the two houses of Congress could certainly
inquire whether the certificate presented had actually been
signed by the executive, or whether the certificate contained a
clear mistake of fact. The certificate, Bradley said, was a docu-
ment of high authority, but not conclusive as to such cases. But
in the present case there was no claim that the certificate of the
Governor [of Florida] had been forged, or that there was any
mistake of fact in it, or that it was willfully false and fraudulent.
If erroneous at all, its error stemmed from erroneous proceed-
ings of the canvassing board. But the canvassing board had
been authorized by Florida law to decide which returns [were]
to be counted and had some authority to disregard false or
fraudulent returns. The state itself could provide for any sort of
election contest challenging the returns of the board so long as
it was concluded by the time that the electors were to cast their
vote in December. Here, of course, the state proceedings had
occurred after that date. 131
Indeed, Rehnquist quotes Justice Davis-the idealized neutral party
who declined to serve on the Electoral Commission-as privately re-
marking that "[n]o good lawyer, not a strict partisan, could decide other-
wise" than Justice Bradley.1 32 But Tilden's supporters relied upon estab-
lished legal principles as well. Rehnquist summarizes Justice Clifford's
argument "that, legally, 'fraud vitiates everything.' In other words, if the
131. Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 173. Rehnquist's book omits any reference to the
decisive nature of the date for counting Florida's electoral votes 124 years later in Bush v.
Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000) (concluding that "any recount seeking to meet the
December 12 date will be unconstitutional").
132. Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 185.
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canvassing board had acted fraudulently, it was just as if it had not acted
at all."133 An understanding of these conflicting legal positions was essen-
tial for whoever decided the election.
For some, the existence of a legal dispute necessitates the involve-
ment ofjudges. "This was a dispute; disputes are traditionally resolved by
courts. '134 So writes Chief Justice Rehnquist in explaining why "[i]t was
quite natural for Congress to turn to the justices of the Supreme Court as
members of the Electoral Commission."' 3 5 But Supreme Court Justices
are not the only people capable of understanding the factual or legal
issues raised in a contested election. As Judge Wilkinson explains, "our
Structural Constitution confers the priceless values of self-governance
upon many different entities."' 3 6 Thus "[t]he threshold question for a
judge under the Structural Constitution is not, 'How should I resolve this
case?' It is rather, 'To whom does the Constitution entrust the resolution
of this issue?'"137 Chief Justice Rehnquist knows that, of course. The
adjudication of contested elections is precisely the kind of question the
Constitution sometimes commits to institutions besides federal judges.
138
The need for expertise, in short, does not inevitably point toward judges
as the ideal parties to resolve contested elections. Indeed, Justice Bradley
insisted in his Electoral Commission opinion that "it is a grave question
whether any courts can thus interfere with the course of the election for
President and Vice-President." 13 9 And Justice Breyer wrote in Bush v.
Gore that "[h]owever awkward or difficult it may be for Congress to re-
solve difficult electoral disputes, Congress, being a political body, ex-




Any historical evidence uncovered today will not change the fact that
Rutherford B. Hayes, not Samuel Tilden, served as the nineteenth Presi-
dent of the United States. Such evidence would be untimely, for elec-
tions must be resolved much more rapidly than most other matters
presented to the courts, the legislature, or executive agencies. Consider
that the median civil lawsuit requires more than nine years to be decided
133. Id. at 174. Afterward, Justice Field complained that "[i]t is the first time, I
believe, that it has ever been held by any respectable body of jurists, that a fraud was
protected from exposure by a certificate by its authors." Id. at 189.
134. Id. at 119.
135. Id.
136. Wilkinson, supra note 21, at 1706.
137. Id. at 1707.
138. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 (providing that "Each House shall be the Judge of
the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members").
139. Electoral Commission Proceedings, supra note 70, at 1024.
140. 531 U.S. 98, 155 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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by a federal court,1 4 ' or that Congress itself sometimes takes an entire
session to resolve a dispute about the election of one of its members. The
luxury of such time is not available in a presidential election when the
dates imposed by law and mounting popular pressure may demand a de-
cision before all of the evidence needed to make the best decision is avail-
able. As one observer of the 1876 election explained, "It was more impor-
tant that the presidential issue should be decided effectively than that it
should be decided rightly."'
4 2
The vote counting in the 1876 presidential election was constrained
by two dates fixed by federal law. First, the electors had to meet by De-
cember 6. Second, the Constitution provided that the new president was
to take office on March 4. The state canvassing boards hurried to com-
plete their work by the December 6 deadline. In Florida, the board fin-
ished just hours before the deadline. Congress, then, acted to count the
electoral votes in order to meet the March 4 deadline. The Electoral
Commission's proceedings reflected the need to act in time for Congress
to validate-or reject-the results.
Rehnquist writes that "it is not possible to say how time-consuming
even an inquiry into the claims of fraud would have been, or how clear-
cut any result would have been" if the Electoral Commission had looked
beyond the official certificates presented by the contested states.' 43 But
Rehnquist suggests the process could have been lengthy, given the ever-
expanding scope of the questions involved:
The Democrats emphasized the likelihood of fraud-that re-
turning boards had disallowed proper votes in order to reach a
desired result. The Republicans spoke of intimidation of black
voters-would this, too, be a permissible issue? If so, there was
an added difficulty in that the chain of causation was much
more indirect and difficult to prove. If night riders had gone
through a town two weeks before the election, would claims be
141. SeeJudicial Facts and Figures, Table 4.7: U.S. District Courts. Civil and Criminal
Median Times (Month)-Filing to Disposition, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
judicialfactsfigures/table4.07.pdf (last visited Sept. 11, 2004) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (reporting statistics for 2003).
142. Monroe, supra note 20, at 527. For a more recent expression of that idea, see
Rodriguez v. Cuellar, No. 04-04-003335-CV, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 6145, at *21 (Tex. App.
July 12, 2004) ("The purpose of an election contest is to determine whether the outcome
of an election is correct. However, elections are politically time sensitive, and legislative
remedies for contested elections are to be strictly followed." (internal citations omitted)).
Of course, election disputes are not the only context in which timeliness is especially
important. See, e.g., Zajaczkowski v. Zajaczkowska, 932 F. Supp. 128, 130 (D. Md. 1996)
(asserting that "any dispute involving custody of a child be decided quickly").
143. Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 184. Tilden supporter and former Attorney General
Jeremiah Black mocked the concern that "it would be troublesome, and require a great
deal of time, to ascertain who was duly appointed by the people. It was much easier to
accept the false vote and say no more about it." Black, supra note 29, at 25. Black insisted
"there was no difficulty in it." Id.
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entertained that black voters refrained from voting because of
this?1
44
Rehnquist only begins to identify the issues that could have been
raised in a comprehensive review of the election. President Grant re-
marked that "if all eligible voters had been free to vote their preferences,
the Republicans would have triumphed in Mississippi, North Carolina,
and Arkansas."1 45 Grant later added Alabama, Connecticut, and New
York to the list of states in which Hayes "had been 'clearly elected by the
legal vote."" 46 Ten years after the election, Hayes himself wrote:
In 1876 the Republicans were equitably entitled to the advan-
tages of the Fifteenth Amendment under which, if it had been
obeyed and enforced, they would have had a majority of the
popular vote of the country and at least 203 electoral votes to
Tilden's 166. This includes Louisiana, Florida, Mississippi, Ala-
bama, and South Carolina among the Republican States.
147
Then, in 1890, a Mississippi judge remarked that "[i] t is no secret
that there has not been a full vote and a fair count in Mississippi since
1875-that we have been preserving the ascendancy of the white people
by revolutionary methods." 48 How long would it have taken to judge
those claims about what really happened on election day in 1876? Again,
an effective means of resolving a disputed election must reach its conclu-
sion quickly enough to establish who is entitled to serve in an office once
it becomes vacant.
IV. CONCLUSION
Whether Hayes or Tilden actually "won" the election of 1876 will
never be known, for it depends both upon evidence that has long since
disappeared and assumptions about the proper scope of any inquiry into
a fair election. And the focus upon the contested states of Florida, Louisi-
ana, Oregon, and South Carolina obscures the many other historical con-
tingencies that could have swayed the election one way or the other, such
as the admission of Colorado as a state just in time for the new state's
legislature to select three Hayes delegates.
144. Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 184.
145. Simpson, supra note 94, at 9.
146. Id. at 13.
147. Diary Entry (Dec. 10, 1886), in 4 Hayes Diary and Letters, supra note 1, at 297,
297; see also Letter from Rutherford B. Hayes to S. Shellabarger (Jan. 2, 1877), in 3 Hayes
Diary and Letters, supra note 1, at 399, 399 (asserting that "[o]n the Louisiana vote our
equitable right to the State is indisputable.... If we go back of the Returning Board, why
not go into the merits? How would Louisiana have voted if the election had been fair?").
148. Barnard, supra note 1, at 302 (quoting Francis Butler Simkins, A History of the
South 315 (2d ed. 1953)). In contrast, Morris insists that many African Americans willingly
voted for Tilden in 1876. See Morris, supra note 5, at 148 (writing that "Louisiana
Democrats made a concerted and somewhat successful effort to appeal to black voters who
had grown increasingly disgusted by years of Republican misrule and neglect").
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HOW NOT TO COUNT VOTES
According to Morris, "[i]n the post-election campaign to assert his
right to the presidency, Hayes was far busier and more effective than
Tilden-one might almost say that his actions were presidential." 49
Hayes also proved to be a better President than many expected. Morris
relates how one individual Democrat remarked after Hayes completed his
presidential term that "he has done so well that I sometimes almost wish
he had been elected." 150 But Hayes labored through his single term in
office with enduring references to "'His Fraudulency,' 'the Great
Usurper,' and 'Rutherfraud B. Hayes."151
The institutions involved in deciding the 1876 presidential election
failed to do so in a manner that gained the acceptance of the nation. It
was really the state canvassing boards in Florida, Louisiana, and South
Carolina that decided the election. The Electoral Commission deferred
to those decisions, and Congress deferred to the Electoral Commission.
Morris makes a strong case that the boards were poor judges of the elec-
tion, and I agree that it was those boards that miscounted the votes.
Rehnquist ably defends both the integrity of the Electoral Commission
and the commission's legal rationale for not recounting the votes that
were officially submitted to Congress by the contested states. But the fail-
ure of the commission to command the approval of history confirms that
Hayes was right when he called for a better institutional arrangement for
deciding contested elections.
What that arrangement should be remains to be determined. Impar-
tiality, expertise, and timeliness are central to any system for resolving
disputed elections. Indeed, the resolution of contested elections also
presumes some understanding that the result of the election is in doubt.
As Morris writes,
[h]ad it not been for the dramatic, late-night intervention of
two canny Republican politicos and a bitterly partisan newspa-
per editor, the election would never have been contested in the
first place, and the nation would not have been subjected to
four long months of bold-faced political chicanery masquerad-
ing as statesmanship. 1 52
Rehnquist and Morris have contributed greatly to our understanding
of the flaws in our system for deciding presidential elections by their care-
ful review of the events following election day 1876. The lessons of that
history, and of its virtual repeat in 2000, encourage further consideration
of whether there is a better way of judging disputed elections-ideally
before another one occurs.
149. Morris, supra note 5, at 207.
150. Id. at 252.
151. Id. at 2, 241.
152. Id. at 3.
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